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LUOGO E SPAZIO, PLACE AND SPACE: GENDER QUOTAS 
AND DEMOCRACY IN ITALY· 
Rachel A. Van Cleave2 
Space is power. Having a place, a seat, an ability to occupy a 
particular space can empower, in part by mere presence, but also by 
enabling a voice to be heard, to provide new perspectives, new ways 
of thinking and doing.3 Certainly, the recent Arab Uprisings4 and the 
1. Copyright © 2012 Rachel A. Van Cleave. 
2. Rachel A. Van Cleave, Dean and Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of 
Law. Dean Van Cleave has engaged in extensive research on Italian criminal justice, 
specifically violence against women, as a Fulbright Scholar. She wishes to thank the 
University of Baltimore School of Law and its Applied Feminism Center for the 
opportunity to present this paper at the March 2-3, 2012 conference; the University oj 
Baltimore Law Review staff for their patience working with Italian materials and 
sources; Golden Gate University School of Law's generous financial support of this 
project; Golden Gate University School of Law's library staff; her research assistants, 
Melani Johns (J.D., 2011) and Brian Ford (J.D., 2013); the libraries at the Corte di 
Cassazione and the Camera dei deputati in Rome for access as well as helpful 
research guidance by the staff; Anna Esposito, Ferdinando Berelli, Stefania Rossi and 
Bianca d' Amico for their company while the author was in Rome; Diane Ghirardo for 
sparking an interest in gendered space and power as well as for translation and 
editorial advice on an earlier version; Michele Benedetto Neitz, Laura Cisneros for 
substantive and structural comments; Golden Gate Uuniversity School of Law's 
Scholarship Support Group; and Joseph Schottland for unfailing encouragement and 
moral support. Of course, any errors are the author's. 
3. In a keynote address at Golden Gate University School of Law's Diversity 
Graduation, Nancy O'Malley, District Attorney for Alameda County in California, 
emphasized the importance of having a seat at the table where decisions are being 
made. She stated, "If you [women, people of color, and LGBT people 1 are not at the 
table, there is a good chance you are on the menu." Nancy O'Malley, Dist. Att'y, 
Almeda Cnty., Cal., Keynote Address at the Golden Gate University School of Law's 
Diversity Graduation (May 17,2011). Similarly, at the Third Annual Chief Justice 
Ronald M. George Lectureship, Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of the California 
Supreme Court, as well as participants on a panel of chief justices, repeatedly stated 
the importance of "having a seat at the table." Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, 
Cal. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the Golden Gate University School of Law's Third Annual 
Chief Justice Ronald M. George Lectureship (Oct. 18, 2011). In addition, during the 
two-day conference at the University of Baltimore School of Law, Applying 
Feminism Globally, participants said the phrase "a seat at the table" at least a half-
dozen times. Remarks at the University of Baltimore School of Law, Applying 
Feminism Globally Conference (Mar. 2-3, 2012). 
4. E.g., Ethan Bronner, A Moment Leveled, Solidarity for Shiites and Large-Scale 
Demonstrations: Bahrain Tears Down Pearl Sculpture, N.Y. TIMEs, March 19,2011, 
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"Occupy" movement5 took the fonns they did, at least in part, 
because the participants understood the importance of physically 
occupying symbolically loaded spaces and places to promote political 
and social ideas and ideals.6 Conversely, exclusion from a place or 
at AlO (discussing the Bahraini government's destruction of the famous pearl 
sculpture at the center of Pearl Square in the capitol city Manama, Bahrain), available 
at http://www.nytimes.coml20 11I03/19/world!middleeastlI9bahrain.html. 
Thousands of pre-democracy demonstrators occupied Bahrain's symbolic center, Pearl 
Square, in a month-long rally claiming a 300-foot sculpture of a pearl, held by six 
sweeping arches, designed to honor the six gulf states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), 
whose economies thrived on the pearl industry before the oil boom. ld.; Michael 
Slackman, Bahrain Takes the Stage With a Raucous Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.coml20 I 1102/1 6/world!middleeastll6bahrain. 
htrnl?pagewanted=I&J=I&partner=rss&emc=rss. Bahrain's foreign minister, Sheik 
Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, stated that the monument was destroyed "to remove a 
bad memory .... The whole thing caused our society to be polarized." Bronner, 
supra. He further stated, "We don't want a monument to be a bad memory." ld. 
Thus, the government also appreciated the symbolic nature of Pearl Square and 
decided to destroy it due to its power. See Associated Press, Bahrain Demolishes 
Monument at Pearl Square: Pearl Roundabout Symbol Was Rallying Point for 
Activists, NBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2011, 5:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com lid! 
42125406/ns/world _ news-mideastn _ africal#. T8 _ 6Pb-He _0. 
5. See Peter Millership, World intrigued by "Occupy Wall Street" Movement, REUTERS 
(Oct. 11, 2011, 11 :36 AM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/20 1111 O/l1/us-usa-
wallstreet-world-idUSTRE79A30B20111011 (observing that popular movements 
against the powerful elite have been staged in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Green Square, 
Tripoli, Syntagma Square, Athens, and Zuccotti Park, New York, expanded to Occupy 
movements in Tampa, Florida, Portland, Oregon, Los Angeles, California, Chicago, 
Illinois, and then inspired similar movements at the London Stock Exchange and 
Madrid's Puerta del Sol square); Julianne Pepitone, Hundreds of Protesters Descend 
to 'Occupy Wall Street', CNNMONEY (Sep. 17,2011,7:07 AM), http://money.cnn. 
coml2011/09/17/technology/occupy _ wall_streetl?cnn=yes&hpt=ibu_c2 (noting that 
"[p]rotestors arranged to meet and discuss their goals on the iconic Wall Street Bull 
statue ... as well as at a 'people's assembly' at One Chase Manhattan Plaza," as part 
of a "leaderless resistance movement" modeled on the Arab uprisings); Kenneth 
Rapoza, 'Occupy Wall Street' Creators Raise the Stakes, Gun for G8 and NATO, 
FORBES (Jan. 26, 2012, 10: 18 AM), http://www.forbes.comlsites/kenrapoza/ 
2 0 12/0 I 1261 occupy-wall-street -creators-raise-the-stakes-gun-for -g8-and -natol 
(reporting that Occupy Wall Street selected the NATO and G8 summits in Chicago, 
May 2012, as new targets for its movement). 
6. See Susana Torre, 'Claiming the Public Space: The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo,' in 
SEX AND THE ARCHITECTURE (Diana Agrest, Patricia Conway & Leslie Weisman eds.), 
reprinted in GENDER SPACE ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 
140, 141-42 (Jane Rendell, Barbara Penner & lain Borden eds., 2000) (describing 
how women in Argentina appropriated a public space, the Plaza de Mayo, which was 
symbolically important in silent protest against "disappearances" of thousands of 
people, including their children and husbands, in the mid-1970s by the Argentine 
military). Torre discusses the impact of this occupation in both gender and spatial 
terms. ld. at 142. 
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"negative presence,,7 often has the effect of silencing and of 
marginalizing those who are excluded. 8 What do space, place, and 
power have to do with electoral quotas for women in Italy? As in 
other countries, women in Italy have been affirmatively excluded 
from many public and political spaces9 until relatively recently. \0 
Italian law has enforced and reinforced such exclusions, this negative 
presence and marginalization of women in Italian public life. II This 
article examines how the law has been used to exclude women from 
political space and place in Italy, and more generally, the impact this 
has had on women's citizenship rights as well as the impact on 
democracy. 12 In addressing these issues, this article also details the 
more recent attempts to provide access to important political spaces, 
namely at the national and local levels of government. 13 Framing this 
discussion in terms of space and place helps dislodge the issue of 
quotas from the stigma with which they are associated in the United 
States, in particular. 14 In addition, this perspective seeks to eschew 
7. Shirley Ardener, The Partition of Space, in WOMEN AND SPACE: GROUND RULES AND 
SOCIAL MAPS (Shirley Ardener ed., 1993), reprinted in GENDER SPACE 
ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 112, 113-14 (Jane Rendell, 
Barbara Penner & lain Borden eds., 2000). 
8. See bell hooks, 'Choosing the Margin as a Space of Radical Openness' in BELL HOOKS, 
YEARNINGS: RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS (1989), reprinted in GENDER 
SPACE ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 203, 205, 207-08 (Jane 
Rendell, Barbara Penner & lain Borden eds., 2000) (providing a poignant account of 
the pain of discussing issues of "space and location" when living in both the space at 
the margin, as a black woman the space of the oppressed, as well as "at the center," 
the space of the dominant as a professor at a major American university). 
9. While the term "public space" includes "political space," I believe that it is helpful to 
consider "political space" more specifically, particularly in the context of electoral 
quotas. See Laura Palazzani, La Cittadinanza tra Uguaglianza e DifJerenza: Le 
Istanze del Femminismo Giuridico, 219 ARCHIVIO GlURlDlCO 321, 333 (1999) 
(asserting that the public/private dichotomy results in the "masculine public" that 
politically dominates the depoliticized "feminine"). 
10. See infra notes 30-41,72-81 and accompanying text. 
II. See infra Part IILA. 
12. See infra Parts I, lILA. 
13. See infra notes 124, 127, 130, 133-39, 143-50 and accompanying text. 
14. See Ruth Rubio-Marin, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and 
Why it Won't Fly in the United States, 60 AM. J. COMPo L. 99,118-19 (2012) (arguing 
that a set of social, legal, historical, and cultural factors make the use of quotas to 
achieve a parity democracy unlikely in the U.S. because women's political exclusion 
was traditionally assumed rather than statutorily implemented, as opposed to racial 
disparity, which was written into the Apportionment Clause and the Fugitive Slave 
Clause of the Constitution). The reactionary movements in the U.S. resisting 
women's rights rely heavily on family-related specificities of women in child-rearing 
and household management and have created a presumption that measures requiring 
equality in the public and private spheres amount to affronts to the traditional family. 
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the vexed dichotomies of formal versus substantive equality and 
equality of opportunity versus equality of results. Instead, the 
structure of space, place, and power provides a richer lens through 
which to consider electoral quotas to create political space for 
women, broaden representation, and enhance democracy. 15 
Part I of this article briefly outlines the traditional "equality" 
approaches for evaluating quotas, in order to illustrate that notions of 
equality are only partially useful for resolving questions of electoral 
quotas for women. This section also considers the meaning of the 
term quota and explains that there is a broad array of measures that 
comes within the term electoral quota. This range of methods for 
increasing the presence of women in elected offices calls for a 
broader and richer lens through which to view them. 16 Part II 
explores the framework of space, place, and power to consider how 
this perspective might reshape the discussion of quotas and other 
affirmative measures to increase the number of women in elected 
office. Part III delves into the history of equality struggles in Italy 
beginning with an in-depth look at the legally sanctioned negative 
presence of women. This section also briefly describes relatively 
recent efforts of the feminist movement to bring about equality from 
women's external, negative presence. Finally, Part IV turns to 
specific examples of efforts to undo this proscription and establish 
what a number of Italian scholars describe as "equilibrium" of the 
sexes in political representation. 17 The Italian Parliament and the 
Constitutional Court have been the protagonists in this effort, with 
one institution advancing quotas while the other resists and then both 
ld. at 119-24; see also Aili Mari Tripp, Creating Collective Capabilities: Women, 
Agency, and the Politics of Representation, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 219, 224-25 
(2010) (indicating that there is little discussion of collective strategies to address 
women's political disempowerrnent in the U.S. because the liberal philosophical 
frame in the U.S. does not encompass a sense that women have experienced collective 
disempowerrnent, as opposed to individual inadequacy). 
15. Anne Phillips explored similar issues, specifically challenging arguments against the 
importance of presence. ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE (1995). My 
research reinforces her arguments but considers the specific example of electoral 
quotas in Italy and the history of the deliberate exclusion of women from citizenship 
rights. See infra Parts lILA, IV. 
16. See infra Part I. 
17. See MARILA GUADAGNINI & LUCIA AMARAL, lntroduzione, in DA ELEITRJCI A ELETfE: 
RIFORME ISTITUZIONALI E RApPRESENTANZA DELLE DONNE IN ITALIA, IN EUROPA E 
NEGLI STAT! UNITI [From Electric to Elected: Institutional Reforms and 
Representation of Women in Italy, in Europe and in the United States] 7 (Marila 
Guadagnini ed., 2003); infra Part IV. 
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switching roles. IS This section also describes the current status of 
electoral quotas in Italy. 19 
I. FORMAL EQUALITY ESCHEWS "DISCRIMINATION TO 
REMEDY DISCRIMINATION" 
Traditional notions of equality dictate that government should not 
use discrimination in the form of quotas to correct past 
discrimination.20 On the basis of this assumption, the law must 
remain neutral unless there is current discrimination, which is 
appropriate to prevent and to remedy. 2 I This section explores the 
limitations of this approach in the U.S. and contrasts it with 
differences in the Italian Constitution.22 This section also considers 
different forms of electoral quotas.23 
In the U.S., the traditional equality framework is consistent with 
the constitutional approach to individual rights; the Constitution acts 
as a negative force limiting the government's ability to infringe on 
certain rights of individuals.24 The U.S. approach also helps to 
explain why, despite a history of exclusion and discrimination against 
women, people of color, and other minorities, the state has limited 
abilities to implement affirmative policies to correct or rectify past 
18. See ilfra Part IV. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42,242-50,257. 
20. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003); Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & 
Ruth Rubio-Marin, Constitutional Justification of Parity Democracy, 60 ALA. L. REv. 
1171, 1177 (2009); Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality 
on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 
1170 (2006). 
21. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351-52. 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 30-41. 
24. See Tripp, supra note 14, at 219 (arguing that while the liberal philosophical approach 
emphasizes individual capabilities, it must also encompass the collective capability to 
act, and must include principles of agency, before women can reach the full potential 
of citizenry). Collective strategies, like the introduction of quotas make it possible to 
tackle structural gender disparities in ways that cannot be achieved by individualistic 
approaches to gender equality, and enhance the effectiveness of individualistic 
strategies. Id. at 224-25; see also Rubio-Marin, supra note 14, at 100 (noting that 
Europe is gradually shifting from an equal rights/opportunities sex equality 
framework to a parity democracy equality model, which enables the genders to 
participate in all domains of citizenship equally). The parity democracy model 
emphasizes that equality between the sexes in both the public and private domain is 
necessary for a properly functioning democracy, rather than merely a nicety that 
formal equality is expressed in a categorical rule of not treating the sexes differently, 
as opposed to a substantive equality mandate which would ensure that there are no 
disadvantages attached to a person's sex. Id. at 105, 113. 
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discrimination and exclusion.25 Clearly, an approach triggered only 
when discrimination is present is not capable of promoting 
inclusion.26 
By contrast, the Italian Constitution, like other post-war 
constitutions, includes positive language setting out what the 
government must do to protect individual rights. 27 While the use of 
positive rights language does not eliminate the need for an equality 
analysis, such language directing government to remove barriers to 
equality establishes a basis for this analysis to expand beyond the 
cramped considerations of fonnal equality. The key here is that 
constitutional acknowledgement of the need to address obstacles to 
equality allows history and context to inform and thus enrich an 
equality analysis, opening the door to remedial measures designed to 
overturn discriminatory practices and laws. 28 Exposing the history 
and context of the "negative presence" of women in public life, for 
25. See, e.g., Grntter, 539 U.S. at 333,351-52. 
26. Rosenblum, supra note 20, at 1128 (providing a compelling and comprehensive 
explanation of the difference between the French concern with "parity" to support 
quotas and the concern in the United States with combating discrimination, and how 
these distinct perspectives make quotas impossible to support in the U.S., but tenable 
in France, at least as to women). Other approaches have examined the impact that 
extremely low numbers of women in elected office have had on the ability to achieve 
a "true democracy." Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marin, The Gender of 
Representation: On Democracy, Equality, and Parity, 6 INT'L 1. CONST. L. 287,289 
(2008) ("[A] model of democracy based on gender parity completes the transition 
from the liberal state to the democratic state."). See also Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & 
Ruth Rubio-Marin, supra note 20, at 1182-83 (arguing that gender parity is necessary 
because the democratic state is currently a patriarchal state as a response to the 
concern that parity would require affirmative action for other underrepresented 
groups). Negative rights, or the right to engage in an activity free from governmental 
interference, are the traditional framework of rights in the U.S. Generally, negative 
rights adequately serve the interests of the political majority in a democracy. 
However, positive rights to engage in an activity allow politically under-represented 
groups in a democracy to correct structural shortfalls, even if the correction requires 
governmental assistance. See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of 
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 883 n.12 (1989). See generally Paul N. Cox, 
The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on 
Judicial Role, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 87 (1981) (exploring the validity of "voluntary" 
affirmative action plans versus the validity of "involuntary" quotas); Barbara Stark, 
Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward 
and "Entirely New Strategy", 44 HASTINGS LJ. 79 (1992) (discussing the potential to 
establish new economic and social standards in the United States by ratifying the 
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights). 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92 (discussing the Italian Constitution equality 
provisions in more detail). 
28. See Yvonne Galligan, Bringing Women in: Global Strategies for Gender Parity in 
Political Representation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 319, 319-
29 (2006); discussion infra Part IIl.A. 
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example, understood as a condition established and perpetuated by 
legal and social frameworks, can enhance an awareness of the need to 
broaden inclusion, as well as help clarify what such reforms might 
look like.29 
Several countries use reserved seat quotas for elected or appointed 
positions,30 which guarantee that women will hold political office and 
thus a place in government.3! Yet, this definition does not represent 
what Italy and other countries have designed in attempts to increase 
the number of women in elected offices. Other countries approach 
the problem of few women in politics less directly by enacting laws 
that impose requirements on the formation or presentation of 
candidate lists, ensuring that women have a place on the ballots that 
may then lead to a place in government. 32 As of 2007, twenty-six 
countries had adopted candidate quota laws requiring political parties 
to put forth a certain percentage of female candidates.33 Space 
matters even in such apparently trivial matters as placement on the 
ballot. Eleven of the countries with candidate quotas further insist on 
placement mandates to ensure that women candidates are not listed at 
the bottom of the ballot.34 These countries have found that when 
women candidates are so placed they rarely take office because their 
party's proportionate share of seats is unlikely to be great enough to 
reach the bottom of the ballot.35 For example, Mexico's electoral law 
29. See Galligan, supra note 28, at 319-21; infra Part IlI.A. 
30. DRUDE DAHLERUP, WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL GENDER QUOTAS?: FROM 
STUDIES OF QUOTAS DISCOURSES TO RESEARCH TO QUOTA EFFECTS 25 (2006), 
available at http://ipsa-rcl9.anu.edu.auIDahlerup.ipsa06.pdf (setting out a chart 
listing elected reserved seats in countries such as Rwanda, Jordan, Burundi and 
countries with reserved seats for appointed positions, such as Tanzania, Pakistan and 
Kenya). 
31. Id. at 6,25. 
32. See Galligan, supra note 28, at 321-23. 
33. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws 
on the Election of Women, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5,6-7 (2009) (describing Argentina as 
the first country to adopt candidate quota laws); see also Galligan, supra note 28, at 
321-29 (analyzing the success of candidate quotas and ballot placement 
requirements). 
34. Schwindt-Bayer, supra note 33, at 11-12. 
35. See e.g., Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, In Egypt's New Parliament, Women Will Be 
Scarce, NPR, ALL TmNGS CONSIDERED (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/ 
01/19/1454683 65/in-egypts-new-parliament-women-will-be-scarce (describing recent 
elections in Egypt which resulted in less than 2% of parliamentary seats going to 
women and explaining that women on party lists were placed "far down on those lists, 
meaning they had virtually no chance of getting into office"). 
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requires parties to list candidates alternating between men and 
women candidates.36 
Another creative example is a 2004 Italian law designed to increase 
the number of women elected to the European Parliament. 37 This law 
provided that, for the 2004 and 2009 elections, neither sex could 
make up more than two-thirds of the candidates.38 While this is 
similar to one of the laws discussed below/9 this law included the 
additional measure of reducing monetary reimbursements by up to 
one-half for any party that presented a list of candidates in violation 
of the two-thirds maximum of either sex.40 Thus, the law directly 
impacted political parties by creating both incentives to include more 
women as well as penalties for not doing SO.41 
The discussion in Part IV of regional laws in Italy reveals that there 
are a number of other creative affirmative measures governments can 
pursue to improve the likelihood of increasing the number of women 
in elected office.42 The definition of quotas used in the traditional 
equality analysis is primarily about reserved seats, and is therefore 
inapposite when it comes to evaluating other affirmative measures. 43 
An alternative to traditional notions of formal equality, the lens of 
space and place, enriches an exploration of the use of electoral 
quotas. 
II. GENDERED SPACE AND PLACE 
Political space everywhere is gendered. Gendered spaces reinforce 
the dichotomy between public and private spheres in how it relegates 
women to the domestic, private sphere while men claim control of the 
public.44 This dichotomy has systematically denied women access to 
36. C6digo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [COFIPE] [Federal 
Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures], art. 220, Diaro Ofical de la Fedraci6n 
[DO], 14 de Enero de 2008 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mxI 
LeyesBiblio/pdflCOFIPE.pdf. 
37. See Leggi 8 aprile 2004, n. 90, art. 3, in Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica 
Italiana[G.U.] 9 aprile 2004, n. 84 (It.), available at http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/ 
2004/84/1.htm. 
38. ld at art. 3, para. 1. 
39. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
40. L. n. 90, art. 3, para. 2/2004 (It.). A similar mechanism was enacted in France to 
achieve greater parity in elections for the National Assembly. See Rosenblum, supra 
note 20, at 1146 (discussing the French law requirement that a party's lists include 
one-half men and one-half women and provides for a reduction in state financial 
support proportionate to degree to which the list does not meet this standard). 
41. See L. n. 90, art. 3/2004 (It.). 
42. See infra notes 206-17, 228-43 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
44. See Leslie Kanes Weisman, Women's Environmental Rights: A Manifesto, in 
HERESIES: A FEMINIST PUBLICATION ON ART AND POLITICS (1981), reprinted in 
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public space and therefore to political space.45 Indeed, especially 
political space. Of course, political space is only one of many 
gendered spaces. Historically, men have been the architects of most 
spaces because they have dominated the professions and careers that 
create, define, and thus, control spaces.46 From constructing separate-
sex public bathrooms,47 to determining the layout of cities,48 to 
structuring government and governmental institutions,49 men have 
GENDER SPACE ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 1, 2 (Jane 
Rendell, Barbara Penner & Iaina Borden eds., 2000). 
45. See id. at 2-4. 
46. See AARON BETSKY, BUILDING SEX: MEN, WOMEN, ARCHITECTURE AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 20-42 (1995) (describing the impact of male 
dominance in the fields of architecture and city planning). 
47. Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture and Gender, 
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 55-56 (2007) (discussing how the gendering of public 
bathrooms is harmful to transgender people); see also LESLIE KANES WEISMAN, 
DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT 
10 (1992) (discussing how "man-made space encodes and perpetuates white male 
power and superiority and the inferiority and subordination of women and 
minorities"). Indeed, the need for separate-sex bathrooms posed a symbolic and 
annoying obstacle to women's full participation in political and governmental life. 
Senator Mikulski discusses her advocacy for a women's bathroom in the Senate. 
Senator Barbara Mikulski, Opening Dialogue, University of Baltimore's Feminist 
Legal Theory Conference: Applied Feminism and Democracy (Mar. 2,2012),42 U. 
BALT. L. REv. 211 (2013). Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has referred to the 
installation of a women's bathroom--equal in size to the men's bathroom-in the 
justice'S robing room, upon her appointment to the Supreme Court of the United 
States in 1993, as a milestone in the progress of women in the American legal 
profession. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 SW. 
U. L. REv. 189, 198 (2003); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women's Progress at the 
Bar and on the Bench, 54 FED. LAW. 50, 51-52 (2007) (noting that American law 
schools notably lacked adequate bathrooms for women prior to the 1970s). 
48. Stephanie Lasker, Sex and the City: Zoning "Pornography Peddlers and Live Nude 
Shows," 49 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2002) (describing how planners zone 
pornography to keep it out of most women's lives, thus also excluding women's 
voices from discussions about pornography). The list of gendered spaces in 
education, in the professions and in the military could go on at great length, with the 
common denominator being denying women access to all of them until relatively 
recently. 
49. For a detailed discussion of the structure of the United State's federal government by 
American draftsmen and the Founding Fathers, see Ray Forrester, The Four American 
Constitutions: A New Perspective, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 963, 967-68 (1993) (noting that 
even after the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, "no 
women, black or white, were enfranchised [with the right to vote]"). For a thorough 
and fascinating discussion of the evolving role of American women in society and 
public life in light of the American Revolution, the American Constitution, and the 
debates of men in State legislatures concerning the role of women in American 
society, see Samantha Ricci, Rethinking Women and the Constitution: An Historical 
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enforced and reinforced gender stereotypes in assembling these 
spaces. 50 The gendered nature of these spaces and places inevitably 
controls women. S1 As one critical architectural theorist states: 
Space, like language, is socially constructed; and like the 
syntax of language, the spatial arrangements of our 
buildings and communities reflect and reinforce the nature 
of gender, race, and class relations in society. The uses of 
both language and space contribute to the power of some 
groups over others and the maintenance of human 
inequality. 52 
Argument for Recognizing Constitutional Flexibility with Regards to Women in the 
New Republic, 16 WM. & MARy J. WOMEN & L. 205, 205-07 (2009). In Italy, women 
made up 3.7% of the constituent assembly that was charged with drafting a new 
constitution after World War II. ELISABETIA PAUCI DI SUN!, IRA PARITA E 
DIFFERENZA: DAL VOTO ALLE DONNE ALLE QUOTE ELETIORAU 38 (2004) [BETWEEN 
PARITY AND DIFFERENCE: FROM WOMEN'S VOTE TO ELECTORAL QUOTAS]' 
50. I do not intend this statement to create a conflict between men as a group and women 
as a group; rather, this merely acknowledges the historical fact that men have 
excluded women from many professions and careers, including architecture, city 
planning, medicine, ecclesiastical hierarchies, and law and government, to name a 
few. See Lasker, supra note 48, at 1175 ("It has become clear that virtually all human 
environments are designed, built, and managed by male dominated professions using 
assumptions that tend to reinforce existing female stereotypes.") (quoting NEW SPACE 
FOR WOMEN 1 (Gerda R. Wekerle et al. eds., 1980)). Certainly, I do not ignore the 
significant efforts of many men in the recent past to overturn this system. For 
example, Senator Mikulski emphasized the important support and guidance she 
received from her male colleagues. Senator Barbara Mikulski, Opening Dialogue, 
University of Baltimore's Feminist Legal Theory Conference: Applied Feminism and 
Democracy (Mar. 2, 2012),42 U. BALT. L. REv. 211 (2013). 
51. The focus of this article is women. However, certainly the gendered structure of 
space also controls transgender people. See Dylan Vade, Explaining Gender and 
Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is 
More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253,261,273-275 
(2005) (arguing against the sex-gender dichotomy as too narrow to protect the "gender 
galaxy" since "[t]he ways to be transgender are endless"). Cf Kogan, supra note 47, 
at 18 (noting that while white men and women in nineteenth century America were 
required to ride in gender segregated rail cars, black women and children were not 
allowed passage in the ladies' car. Instead, they were, "relegated to smoking cars and 
other second-class accommodations with white and black men"); Ann R. Tickamyer, 
Public Policy and Private Lives: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Women's Poverty 
and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 Ky. LJ. 721, 736-40 (1996) (discussing 
the need to scrutinize the "spatiality of communities, labor markets, and households, 
all of which can be shown to be subtly gendered" to better address poverty). 
52. WEISMAN, supra note 47, at 2; see also Leslie M. Rose, The Supreme Court and 
Gender-Neutral Language: Setting the Standard or Lagging Behind?, 17 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL'y 81, 81-84 (2010) (analyzing the exclusionary impact of gender-
specific language in U.S. Supreme Court opinions and arguing for gender-neutral 
language). 
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Analogous to the ways in which architecture "exists fundamentally 
as the expression of an established social order,,,53 legal and political 
structures reflect placement of power with the dominant groUp.54 
Political space, in particular, plays a significant role in structuring a 
society's spaces, and in tum, power exercised through politics has a 
dramatic impact on people, especially on women, and specifically on 
women's political rights and citizenship. 55 
Political space is gendered in many ways. Relevant to this article, 
political space is gendered insofar as it has created the "negative 
presence,,56 of women in the structure of government, which has 
allowed for laws that further limit and stifle women's citizenship and 
public voice. 57 Part III below sets out specific examples. 58 Even in 
the U.S., women were excluded from having a voice in government 
because they were denied the right to vote until 1920.59 
Political space is also gendered due to the stereotypes it reinforces 
about the qualities necessary to be effective in this space. 60 As one 
scholar has pointed out, "[t]he more expansive the executive, the 
more masculine or agentic it becomes in the eyes of [its] citizens.,,61 
This, in turn, impacts whether voters believe women can fill these 
roles.62 The circular and self-fulfilling nature of this problem is 
further highlighted by the claim that legally created space in the form 
of quotas will lead voters to become more comfortable with women 
in elected office, and thus, more inclined to vote for them even if 
53. WEISMAN, supra note 47, at 178. 
54. See DOLORES HAYDEN, THE POWER OF PLACE: URBAN LANDSCAPE AS PUBLIC HISTORY 
22-29 (1995) (discussing how the mapping of geographical space in cities both 
illustrates and reinforces exclusion from political space). 
55. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841, 1857-59 (1994); Margaret Moore, Sub-State 
Nationalism and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1319, 1322 (2004); Adelaide 
H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
443,451-52 (1999). 
56. E.g., hooks, supra note 8, at 208--09. 
57. See Anne Marie Goetz & Shireen Hassim, Introduction: Women in Power in Uganda 
and South Africa, in No SHORTCUTS TO POWER: AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS AND 
POLICY MAKING 1,5-8 (Anne Marie Goetz & Shireen Hassim eds., 2003). 
58. See infra Part III. 
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
60. Paula A. Monopoli, Why So Slow: A Comparative View of Women's Political 
Leadership, 24 MD. 1. INT'L L. 155, 158-59 (2009) (examining the stereotypical 
masculine attributes associated with the "Commander-in-Chief' role of the U.S. 
President). 
61. Id. at 158. 
62. Id. at 158-59. 
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quotas are repealed or phased out. 63 Indeed, each of the studies 
indicates that measures that promote the election of women can lead 
to continued election of women even once those measures are no 
longer in effect. 64 While electoral quotas may be difficult to justify 
under a traditional equality analysis, when men have had a practical 
monopoly on political space and have exercised this power to oppress 
women's citizenship and other rights-as they have in Italy-the 
only effective solution is to break up this monopoly and create 
political space for women.~5 
Restricted political space in Italy denied women the right to vote 
until after World War II; banned women from many professions and 
careers, including elected office; and linked their citizenship to that 
of their husbands. 66 The history of deliberate and explicit exclusion 
of women from political space provides a compelling justification for 
implementing strategies designed to affirmatively open political 
space for women with a goal of achieving substantive equality. 
III. GENDER EQUALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN IT AL Y 
The context of historical negative presence in public life, and 
especially political life in Italy, is important background for 
evaluating the adoption of electoral quotas. This section first traces 
the slow and limited progress of equality in Italy featuring the roles 
played by the Constitutional Court and the government-institutions 
dominated by men.67 Next, this section describes the limited success 
Italian women have had using spaces and places outside of 
governmental institutions.68 Out of both a distrust of governmental 
institutions as well as necessity, Italian women have exerted pressure 
on government from the outside to insist upon inclusion.69 Of course, 
63. See Rikhil R. Bhavnani, Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are Withdrawn? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India, 103 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 23, 29-31 
(2009) (concluding that after quotas lapse women are still successful in subsequent 
elections), available at http://rikhilbhavnani.comIBhavnani%20Do%20electoral%20 
quotas%2Owork%20after''1020they''/020are%20withdrawn.pdf; Maria De Paola et ai, 
Can Gender Quotas Break Down Negative Stereotypes? Evidence from Changes in 
Electoral Rules, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 344, 346-47, 350-51 (2010) (examining voter 
patterns after electoral quotas were found unconstitutional in Italy and concluding that 
such measures are somewhat successful in breaking down negative stereotypes about 
women's ability to be effective political officials). 
64. See Bhavnani, supra note 63, at 34; De Paola, supra note 63, at 348. 
65. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21, 75-123, 182-94. 
66. See discussion infra Part III, for more specific discussions of each of these limitations 
on women's citizenship in Italy. 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 82-123. 
68. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
69. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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the need to continue to resort to spaces external to political space 
further exacerbates the negative presence of women in government. 70 
A. A History of Negative Presence 
It almost goes without saying that the ability to assume elected 
office is an extremely important component of citizenship; 
nonetheless, this is merely one of many aspects of citizenship that has 
been denied women until relatively recently. 71 In Italy, full 
citizenship for women has drawn tantalizingly close in the last thirty 
years. 72 A description of the types of laws that specifically denied 
women full citizenship and excluded them from political life, and the 
extremely long road to reforming those laws, helps to illustrate why a 
form of quotas emerged as the best response to this history. Quotas 
and other affirmative measures can open spaces of political life to 
women after a history of decidedly and deliberately exclusionary 
laws.73 
Italy began to recognize rights most commonly associated with 
citizenship for women only within the last sixty years. 74 These rights 
include the right to vote; 75 to autonomy as to their individual 
citizenship;76 to participate in the judicial system as lay jurors, judges 
and lawyers; 77 as well as the right to hold political and other 
governmental offices.78 Yet, Italy has been slow to recognize most of 
these rights. Some Italian commentators have noted that the concept 
of citizenship was built without consideration of the presence of 
women.79 This may help to explain this delay. However, many laws 
70. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
71. See LUCIA CHIA VOLA, LIBERAZIONE DELLA DONNA: FEMINISM IN ITALY 58 (1986); 
Eileen McDonagh, Citizenship and Women's Election to Political Office: The Power 
of Gendered Public Policies, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL 
CITIZENSHIP 201, 201-02 (Joanna L. Grossman & Linda C. McClain eds., 2009). 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 81-122. 
73. See Ann Peters & Stefan Suter, Representation, Discrimination, and Democracy: A 
Legal Assessment of Gender Quotas in Politics, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF 
WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 174, 174-75 (Joanna L. Grossman & Linda C. McClain 
eds., 2009). 
74. See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra notes 87-93, 99-05 and accompanying text. 
77. See infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text. 
78. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
79. Franca Bimbi & Alisa Del Re, A Cinquant'anni dal Voto, in GENERE E DEMOCRAZIA: 
LA CITTADINANZA DELLE DONNE A CINQUANT' ANN I DAL VOTO 11, 12 (Franca Bimbi 
& Alisa Del Re eds., 1997). 
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that denied women equal citizenship rights expressly excluded 
women, and therefore, cannot be considered mere oversights. 80 
1. The Franchise 
Men in government did not grant women in Italy the right to vote 
until after World War II in the Italian Constitution of 1945.81 Indeed, 
the issue of the franchise for women was controversial from the 
beginning of Italy's unification in 1861.82 Women of Tuscany and 
Lombardia-Veneto had enjoyed the right to vote, but upon unification 
they were suddenly disenfranchised because the Kingdom of Italy did 
not provide for women's suffrage. 83 While the issue of extending the 
right to vote to women was raised shortly after unification, the 
opposition continued to prevail. 84 A law enacted during fascism 
allowed women to vote in local administrative elections, but not in 
political-meaning regional and national-elections. Unfortunately, 
this seemingly progressive law was followed immediately by the 
abolition of the same local entities.85 Finally, a governmental decree 
of 1945 declared that the right to vote extended to women.86 
80. See infra notes 100-09, 113-17 and accompanying text. 
81. Art. 48 (I) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Any citizen, male or female, who has attained 
majority, is entitled to vote." ["Sono elettori tutti i cittadini, uomini e donne, che 
hanno raggiunto la maggiore eta."]). See generally P. Orman Ray, The World-Wide 
Woman Suffrage Movement, I J. COMPo LEGIS. & INT'L L. 220 (1919) (reporting 
women's suffrage efforts through World War I). England was the first western 
government to grant a limited right of suffrage to women in 1834. Id. at 220-21. 
Ireland followed shortly after in 1837, and then several Germanic governments 
permitted women to vote by male proxy during the 1850s and '60s, including several 
Austrian and Prussian provinces. Id. at 221-22. Throughout the 1870s and 80s, the 
right to vote in municipal elections began to be granted to women in the U.s., the 
British Empire, and Europe. Id. at 222-28. Norway became the first independent 
state to grant full parliamentary suffrage to women in 1913. Id. at 234. Holland 
extended complete suffrage to women in 1916, with Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland 
granting full suffrage in 1919. Id. at 235. The U.S. recognized women's right to vote 
with the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920. 
Karen M. Morin, Political Culture and Suffrage in Anglo-American Women's West, 
19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 17, 17-18 (1997). By contrast, it was not until 1971 that 
women in Switzerland were able to vote at the federal level, and not until 1990 that 
the last of the twenty-six cantons extended the right to vote to women, after compelled 
by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. Peters & Suter, supra note 73, at 174. 
82. PALlCl DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 38. 
83. Jd. 
84. Id. at 38-40. 
85. Jd. at 40-41. 
86. Decreto Legislativo 2 febbraio 1945, n. 23 (It.); see also PALICl DI SUNI, supra note 
49, at 41. 
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2. Hurdles to Implementing Constitutional Equality 
Women were allowed to be candidates for the Constituent 
Assembly that drafted the post-war constitution.87 Twenty-one 
women were elected to the Constituent Assembly, which accounted 
for about 3.7% of the Assembly.88 While these women were a small 
minority, at least one commentator asserts that their presence 
required the entire Assembly to write a constitution that "took into 
account the needs and expectations of those who represented more 
than one-half of the population.,,89 The end result was that women 
had a formal "place" in the new constitution; specifically, article 
three declares, "All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal 
before the law, without distinctions of sex, race, language, religion, 
political opinion, personal and social conditions.,,9o This provision 
also states that the republic has a responsibility to remove economic 
and social obstacles that limit equality among citizens,91 yet equality 
rights for women were implemented slowly and reluctantly. 92 One 
justification given by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, an 
advisory body to the Italian Government on administrative matters) 
was that some constitutional provisions, particularly those related to 
equality, merely set out guidelines for future legislation and did not 
create immediately enforceable rights. 93 
The Italian Constitution also specifies that women have the right to 
hold elected positions.94 Despite these and other provisions declaring 
87. Decreto Legislativo 10 marzo 1946 n. 74 (It.). The only requirement imposed on 
candidates was that they be at least 25 years old. Id. 
88. PAUCI DI SUN!, supra note 49, at 42. 
89. Id. 
90. Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Tutti i cittadini hanno pari dignita sociale e sono 
eguali davanti alla legge, senza distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di religione, di 
opinioni politiche, di condizioni personali e sociali."). 
91. Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("E il compito della Repubblica rimuovere gli ostacoli 
di ordine econOinico e sociale, che, llimitando di fatto la liberate I' eguaglianza dei 
cittadini, impediscono il pieno sviluppo della persona umana e l'effettiva 
partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori all'organizzazione politica, economica e socile del 
Paese." ["It is the duty of the Republic to remove economic and social obstacles that 
in fact limit liberty and equality among citizens, that impair full development of one's 
humanity and effect participation of all workers in the political, economic and social 
organizations of the country."]). 
92. See MANUO BELLOMO, LA CONDIZIONE GIURIDICA DELLA DONNA IN ITAUA: VICENDE 
ANTICHE E MODERNE [THE LEGAL CONDITION OF WOMEN IN ITALY: ANCIENT AND 
MODERN EVENTS] 166, 168 (1996). 
93. Id. 
94. Art. 51 (1) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Tutti i cittadini dell'uno 0 dell'altro sesso 
possono accedere agli uffici pubblici e alle cariche elettive in condizioni di 
eguaglianza, secondo I requisiti stability dalla legge." ["All citizens of each sex may 
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equality between the sexes, the initial prevailing interpretation was 
that these constitutional declarations were subject to legislative action 
to implement.95 It was not until after a decision by the Constitutional 
Court in 196096 that the Italian Parliament finally began to abolish 
obstacles and restrictions on women's ability to hold public or elected 
office.97 However, these actions were slow in coming.98 
Despite these first, timid steps toward parity, a married woman's 
citizenship remained dependent upon that of her husband.99 A 1912 
law established that a married woman could not hold citizenship 
different from that of her husband. 100 Thus, if an Italian woman 
married a non-Italian she lost her citizenship. 101 In addition, if her 
Italian husband changed his citizenship, her citizenship was changed 
as well. 102 This remained law until 1975 when the Constitutional 
Court finally declared a portion of this law unconstitutional. 103 Only 
in 1983 did women achieve full equality between spouses on the 
issue of citizenship, when Parliament enacted a law that extended 
citizenship to non-Italians who married Italian women,104 thus 
granting parity in citizenship nearly forty years after the creation of 
the new constitution. 
hold elected and public offices .under equal conditions, according to the requirements 
established by law."]). See infra text accompanying note 204 (discussing a second 
sentence that was added to this section). 
95. PALICI OJ SUNI, supra note 49, at 50. 
96. Corte Costituzionale della Repubblica Italiana 18 maggio 1960, n. 33, available at 
http://www.giurcost.orgldecisionil1960/0033s-60.html(declaring such restrictions in 
violation of the constitution); see also MARlLlSA D'AMICO, IL DIFFICILE CAMMlNO 
DELLA DEMOCRAZIA PARITARIA [THE DIFFICULT ROAD TO A DEMOCRACY OF PARITY] 
xxii (20 ll). 
97. Licia Califano, Azioni Positive e Rappresentanza Politica Dopo Ie Riforme 
Constituzionali [Positive Actions and Political Representation after the Constitutional 
Reforms], in DONNE POLITIC A E PROCESSI DECISIONALI 47, 48 n. 2 (Licia Califano ed., 
2004). 
98. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43. 
99. Legge 13 giugno 1912, n. 555 art. 10, in G.U. 30 giugno 1912, n. 153 (It.), available 
at http://www.agenziabrasitalia.itlleggi/leggeI3giuI912n555.htm. 
100. ld.; see also PALICI OJ SUNI, supra note 49, at 96 (tracing this law to article 14 of the 
Italian civil code of 1865 as well as to article 12 of the Napoleonic code). 
101. L. n. 555 art. 10/1912 (It.). 
102. ld. at art. 11. 
103. Corte Costituzionale della Repubblica Italiana, 16 Aprile 1975, n. 87 (It.). available at 
http://www.giurcost.orgldecisionil1975/0087s-75.html(declaring this law in violation 
of article 29 of the constitution since it creates serious moral, legal and political 
inequality between spouses). The court addressed only article 10 that divested an 
Italian woman of her citizenship if she married a foreigner. 
104. Legge, 21 aprile, 1983, n. 123, in G.U. 26 aprile 1983, n. 112 (It.); see also Califano, 
supra note 97, at 48 n.2; PALICI OJ SUNI, supra note 49, at 97-98. 
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In addition to these inexplicable delays in establishing equal laws 
pertaining to citizenship, equal access to the judicial system for 
Italian women was also slow in coming. Participation in the judicial 
system, such as the right to vote and the right to individual 
citizenship not linked to one's spouse, is an important component of 
full citizenship rights. A post-war law, enacted before the creation of 
the new constitution, provided the basis for women to participate in 
the judicial system as lay jurors. 105 This law specifically declared that 
there should be no distinction on the basis of sex. 106 Although this 
forbade distinctions on the basis of gender, and therefore women 
could serve as lay members of juries, this law gave with one hand and 
took away with the other. It limited the number of women on the list 
of each comune to no more than one-third of the total number of 
those eligible to serve as lay jurors. 107 Furthermore, a 1956 law stated 
that at least one-half of the lay jurors must be men (three out of six) 
on the Corte d'assise.108 The relatively new Constitutional Court 
upheld this limitation, finding that such a provision did not violate 
principles of equality and indeed was necessary for the improvement 
and efficient functioning of different public offices. 109 In effect, 
when initially confronted with quotas, the court found no 
constitutional violation. I 10 
A 1919 law lll declared that women were free to practice any 
profession, private or public work, but included exceptions based on 
sex. A series of laws enacted by the fascist government essentially 
voided the minimal level of equality created by this provision. 112 
Women were prohibited from teaching literature and philosophy in 
the high schools and from being school principals, presidents, or 
directors of professional schools. 113 This chipping away of 
professional options for women, thus intensifying their 
105. Regio Decreto 31 maggie 1946, n. 560 art. 5, in G.U. 41uglio 1946, n. 147 (It.); see 
also PALICI OJ SUNI, supra note 49, at 73. 
106. R.D. n. 560 art. 5/1946 (It.); see also PALICI OJ SUNI, supra note 49, at 73. 
107. R.D. n. 560 art. 5/1946 (It.); see also PALICI OJ SUN!, supra note 49, at 73. 
108. Legge, 27 dicembre 1956, n. 1441, in G.U. 3 gennaio 1957, n. 2 (It.), available at 
http://www.normattiva.itlatto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta= 19 
57-0 1-03&atto.codiceRedazionale=056Ul44I &currentPage= 1; see also P ALICI Dl 
SUN!, supra note 49, at 76. 
109. Corte Cost. 24 settembre 1958, n. 56, 1958, G.U. 18 ottobre 1958, n. 253 (It.), 
available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.itlactionPronuncia.do. 
110. See id. 
Ill. Legge, 17luglio 1919, n. 1176. This law has since been repealed. 
112. See PALICI DI SUN!, supra note 49, at 69-70 (listing various laws passed by the Italian 
fascist government that limited professions for women). 
113. See id. (citing several laws enacted by the fascist government). 
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marginalization, was further highlighted by two laws that prohibited 
women from occupying more than 10% of the positions in any public 
or private workplace, except for "jobs for which women are 
particularly well suited."114 Even after the war, women's exclusion 
from exercising judicial authority remained clear.ll5 Two women 
elected to the Constituent Assembly proposed express language in 
article 51 that would have declared, "Women have access to all 
grades and levels of the judiciary.,,116 The Constituent Assembly 
members, over 96% of whom were men, voted down this proposa1.117 
As to the effect of the constitutional provisions expressly providing 
for equality, the Consiglio di Stato took the position that the 
provisions in the new constitution would not take effect until 
Parliament enacted new laws consistent with the new constitution; 
that is, laws that defined precisely how to implement such changes. 118 
Thus, women were left with the rather circular reasoning that, until 
Parliament enacted laws consistent with the new constitution, the 
prior, albeit possibly unconstitutional, laws were to remain in 
effect. 119 It was not until 1960 that the Constitutional Court 
addressed this issue. 120 At that point, the court concluded that the 
distinction based on sex in the 1919 law violated the constitutional 
principles of equality as defined in the new 1948 constitution. 121 This 
decision eventually resulted in a new law that guaranteed women 
access to all jobs, professions, and public office, including the 
judiciary, without limitation. 122 Given the resistance of those within 
political institutions to dismantling entrenched barriers to equality, it 
is not surprising that the Italian women's movement attempted to 
change from outside these institutions. 
114. See id. at 70 (citing regio decreto-legge 15 ottobre 1938, n. 1514 (It); regio decreto-
legge 20 giugno 1939, n. 898). 
115. /d.at71. 
116. Jd. at 72. 
117. See id. 
118. Cons. Stato, IV, Jan. 18, 1957,n.21 [in Foro it. 1957,III,41-withanote]. 
119. See Corte Cost., 13 maggio 1960, n. 33, Giur. it. 1960 (It.), available at 
http://www.giurcost.orgidecisionilI960/0033s-60.html;Cons.Stato.IV. 18 gennaio 
1957, n. 21, Foro it. 1957, III, 41 (It.). 
120. /d. 
121. /d. 
122. Legge 9 febbraio 1963, n. 66, in G.U. 19 febbraio 1963, n. 48 (It.), available at 
http://www.normattiva.it.luri-resIN2Ls?um:nir:stato:legge: 1963-02-09;66. 
Subsequently, this law was interpreted to have abrogated the requirement that at least 
one half of all lay jurors at the Corle d'assise be women. PALICI Dl SUN!, supra note 
49, at 80. 
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B. The Italian Women's Movement-From Outside Political 
Institutions 
347 
Italy's feminist movement in the 1970s aggressively sought to end 
male dominance of all spheres of public life and male control over 
women in their private lives as well. 123 A full history of the women's 
movement in Italy is beyond the scope of this article. 124 Rather, this 
section describes a few examples of Italian women exerting some 
political power outside of governmental institutions to advance laws 
of particular importance to women-the franchise, the right to an 
abortion, and changes to archaic rape laws. 125 Italian feminism in the 
1970s took "a radical anti-institutional" stancel26 since governmental 
institutions continued to exclude women. Certainly, the limited 
success of the movement illustrates that women can assert political 
power outside of the institutions of government through an effective 
civil society. On the other hand, these examples also reveal the 
serious disadvantages women face when they are denied political 
space within public institutions. Upon the unification of Italy, 
women in Tuscany and Lombardia-Veneto lost the right to vote, and 
all Italian women were denied this right for more than fifty years, 
despite protests in the streets and piazzas. 127 This fifty-year struggle 
resulted in Italian women acquiring the right to vote in 1946-a 
small, albeit important, access to political space. 128 
Yet access to political rights did not ensure access to political 
space, which meant that other anachronistic laws took even longer to 
change. 129 For example, to control of the space of women's bodies, 
the fascist penal code of 1930, Codice Rocco, criminalized 
abortions. 130 To preempt a referendum that would have 
decriminalized abortion, the Italian Parliament enacted law number 
123. See introduction: Coming from the South, in ITALIAN FEMINIST THOUGHT: A READER 
10-11 (paoloa Bono & Sandra Kemp eds., 1991). 
124. Readers wishing to explore Italian feminism may initially consult ITALIAN FEMINIST 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Graziella Parati & Rebecca West eds., 2002) and ITALIAN 
FEMINIST THOUGHT: A READER (paola Bono & Sandra Kemp eds., 1991). 
125. See infra notes 127-29, 131-38 and accompanying text. 
126. Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice of Sexual Difference and Feminist Thought in italy: 
An introductory Essay, in SEXUAL DIFFERENCE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL-SYMBOLIC 
PRACTICE 1,6 (Teresa de Lauretis ed., Teresa de Lauretis & Patricia Cicogna trans., 
The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, 1990). 
127. PALICIOJ SUNJ,supra note 49, at 37-38. 
128. See id. at 41. 
129. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
130. Codice Penale [C.p.] arts. 545-555 (1930). For the only English translation of the 
1930 Italian Penal Code, see italian Penal Code, in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF 
FOREIGN PENAL CODES (John Delaney ed., Edward M. Wise trans., 1978). 
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194 in 1978 to regulate voluntary abortions within the first ninety 
days of pregnancy and criminalize abortions that did not comply with 
the law. l3l This law allowed for abortions in specific and very 
narrow circumstances and also included a provision that allowed 
doctors to refuse to perform abortions. 132 Despite waves of women 
taking to the streets,133 a referendum drafted by women to repeal this 
law failed in 1981, thus allowing male-dominated political space to 
continue to control women's bodies. 134 Also during the 1970s, 
women organized several protests against sexual violence,135 to raise 
awareness about sexual violence within families,136 and to advance 
voter initiatives to reform outdated rape laws. 137 Eventually, a 
number of women's groups presented 300,000 signatures in support 
of a new rape law to Parliament. 138 Certainly, this was a very 
powerful statement that came about despite the historic exclusion of 
women from political institutions. However, it was not until 1996, 
nearly twenty years later, that Parliament finally enacted changes to 
the rape laws; but Parliament did not adopt all of the changes sought 
by the voter initiative.139 While work outside political institutions has 
led to some very modest advances for women, the difficulties 
encountered with such measures and the glacial pace of these 
131. Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194, in G.U. 2 maggio 1978, n. 140 (It.), translated and 
available at 
http://www.columbia.edulitclhistory/degrazialcourseworks/legge _194.pdf; see also 
Yasmine Ergas, 1968-79 Feminism and the Italian Party System: Women's Politics in 
and Decade of Turmoil, 3 COMPo POL. 253, 265-71 (1982) (demonstrating women's 
efforts to put into place legal and completely unrestricted abortions). 
132. See L. n. 14011978 (It.), translated and available at http://www.columbia.edulitc/ 
history/degrazialcourseworks/legge _I 94.pdf. 
133. Emma Baeri, Cerniere di Cittadinanza: 11 Progetto Femminile degli anni '70, in UNA 
DEMOCRAZIA INCOMPIUTA [Critical Aspects of Citizenship: The Feminist Project of 
the 70s, in AN INCOMPLETE DEMOCRACY] 154, 160-61 (Nadia Maria Filippini & Anna 
Scattigno eds., 2007). 
134. See id. at 164-65. While this example is not directly related to the serious 
disproportionate representation of men in the Italian Parliament, the failure of this 
referendum illustrates the continued dominance of women by men. Certainly, this 
also illustrates that not all women support access to abortions. 
135. Id. at 167 (describing a nighttime march called "take back the night"). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 168. 
138. Id. at 169. 
139. For discussions of aspects ofitaly's reform of its rape law, see Rachel A. Van Cleave, 
Renaissance Redux? Chastity and Punishment in Italian Rape Law, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 335, 335-37 (2008) (focusing on a provision that aIlows a reduced sentence 
for sexual assaults which a judge determines are "less serious"); Rachel A. Van 
Cleave, Rape and the Querela in Italy: False Protection of Victim Agency, 13 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 273, 274-75, 292 (2007) (analyzing the failure of the new law to do 
away with the ancient requirement that adult women specificaIly request prosecution). 
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advances only further support the need for mechanisms designed to 
create space for women in government. 140 Such space is much more 
likely to facilitate the protection of women's civil and political rights. 
IV. ELECTORAL QUOTAS IN ITALY 
The account of electoral quotas involves a back-and-forth between 
the Italian Parliament and the Constitutional Court about the 
constitutionality of the methods enacted for creating political space 
for women. Currently, the issue remains before Parliament. 141 While 
this institution initilllly enacted electoral quotas, it no longer seems 
inclined to reenact quotas at the national level. 142 
In a series of measures beginning in 1993, the Italian Parliament 
enacted reforms to remove obstacles to women's access to 
workplaces and to elected positions. 143 While a full consideration of 
women in the workplace is beyond the scope of this article,l44 
affirmative measures to achieve equal access to public and political 
spaces began with a focus on the workplace. 145 In 1991 the Italian 
Parliament enacted a law that called on public and private employers 
at the local and national levels to institute affirmative measures to 
achieve "substantive equality for women in the workplace and ... 
remove obstacles that impede equal opportunity." 146 The law 
required that, within one year of the enactment, all of these entities 
adopt plans for carrying out the goals of this law. 147 The 
Constitutional Court upheld this law as a legitimate exercise of 
legislative authority to ensure equal opportunities for women. 148 The 
140. See generally Van Cleave, Rape and the Querela, supra note 139, at 289 (suggesting 
that a twenty year period between popular protest about rape laws and the legislative 
change of those laws indicates the slow pace of advances for women in Italy). 
141. See generally Marila Guadagnini, The Debate on Women's Quotas in Italian Electoral 
Legislation, 4 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 97,97-101 (1998) (discussing the enactment and 
subsequent repeal of women's voting quotas in Italy). 
142. See id. 
143. See id. 
144. See generally Lara Lazzaroni, Donne, Lavoro e mestieri negati [Women, Work and 
Professions Denied] (2005), available at http://www.uilfpl.itlpdfl 
Donne,%20Lavoro%20Lazzeroni.pdf (last visited May 6, 2012) (providing a 
condensed history ofItalian women's struggle for access to all employment). 
145. See infra note 146. 
146. Legge 10 aprile 1991, n. 125 art. 1(1) (It). The law also provided for reimbursement 
of expenses associated with implementing such affirmative measures. L. n. 125/1991, 
art. 2 (It). 
147. L. n. 125/1991, art. 2(6) (It.). 
148. Corte. Cost., 26 marzo 1993, n. 109 (It.). See Rosalba Valenzano, La Nozione di 
Azione Positiva del Dibattito Italiano, in LA VORO DELLE DONNE E AzIONI POSITIVE 
[The idea of affirmative measures in the Italian debate, in WOMEN'S WORK AND 
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1991 law formed the basis for the enactment of other laws to carry 
out the goal of creating spaces in a variety of workplaces for 
women. 149 For example, a 1992 law established a national fund to 
encourage and support women entrepreneurs who wished to start 
their own businesses. ISO It was against this backdrop that Parliament 
enacted laws intended to increase the presence of women in elected 
offices. 
In the context of significant electoral reforms, lSI the Italian 
Parliament adopted two laws that relied on different mechanisms for 
increasing the numbers of women in elected offices. One law 
mandated that for communali (city) and provinciali (provincial) 
elections, "on the lists of candidates neither sex may represent more 
than two-thirds of the candidates listed."1S2 Thus, this measure 
ensured that political parties would include women on their lists of 
candidates, but did not guarantee that any women would necessarily 
be elected. 153 In discussions of this law, senators stated that the goal 
of this law was "to overcome a serious deficit in our democracy ... a 
serious underrepresentation of women.,,154 In addition, there was 
concern that moving from a proportionate system to majority rule 
would further exacerbate this problem as it had in France. ISS Another 
law, addressing the election of members of the Camera dei deputati, 
the lower house of Parliament, required that the list of representatives 
from each party alternate the names of men and women on the 
AFFIRMATIVE MEASURES] 253 (Mario Giovanni Garofalo ed., 2002) (discussing 
further the laws following the 1991 law and related decisions by the Constitutional 
Court). 
149. See Valenzano, supra note 148. 
150. Legge 25 febbrario 1992, n. 215, art. 3 (It.). This law has since been abrogated. 
Decreto legislativo 11 aprile 2006, n. 198 (It). 
151. Alessandro Pizzorusso & Emanuele Rossi, Le Azioni Positive in Material Elettorale, 
in DONNE IN QUOTA: E GIUSTO RISERVARE POSTI ALLE DONNE NEL LAVORO E NELLA 
POLITICA? [Affirmative action in election rules, in WOMEN IN QUOTA: Is IT RIGHT TO 
RESERVE PLACES FOR WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE AND IN POLITICS?] 169, 170 (Bianca 
Beccalli ed., 1999) (noting that electoral reforms included substituting a proportionate 
system with a majority one and direct elections of mayors and provincial presidents). 
152. Legge 23 febbraio 1995, n. 43, art. 1(6) (It.) ("In ogni lista regionale e provinciale 
nessuno dei due sessi puo essere rappresentato in misura superiore ai due terzi dei 
candidati") (governing elections of consigli delle Regioni); Legge 25 marzo 1993, n. 
81, art. 5(2) (It.) ("Nelle liste dei candidate nessuno dei due sessi puo esere di norma 
reppresentato in misura superiore ai due terzi."). 
153. D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 28 (describing this law as a "list quota" guaranteeing only 
that women were on the list of those who could be elected). 
154. Pizzorusso & Rossi, supra note 151, at 171 n.8 (quoting Atti Senato, 11 marzo 1993). 
155. ld. at 171. 
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ballot. 156 These lists are used to fill 25% of the seats in the Camera 
dei deputati, and once created, the lists are bloccate or frozen. 157 
That is, voters do not vote for individuals, but rather for the parties, 
and since seats are distributed according to the results of the election, 
alternating names on the party lists would ensure that women would 
fill every other seat won by parties in elections. 158 Despite the 
different approaches of these two laws, the Constitutional Court 
declared them both unconstitutional. I59 
Taking a fonnalistic view of articles 3 and 51 of the Italian 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that these affinnative 
measures were unconstitutional. 160 The court explained that while 
section 2 of article 3 requires the republic to pursue affirmative 
measures to remove obstacles to equality, such actions are to provide 
equal opportunities and may not impair the electoral rights of all 
citizens. 161 The court relied on article 48 of the constitution, which 
declares that all citizens who have reached the age of majority may 
vote. 162 The court stated that use of quotas, whether by list quotas or 
alternating seats, interferes with the citizen's right to vote when sex is 
the basis for determining who is or is not on the list or seated as a 
member of Parliament. 163 The court also relied on the language of 
article 51, which states that citizens of each sex may hold elected 
office on equal terms and concluded that any form of quotas based on 
the sex of candidates violates the equality provision of this article. 164 
The court determined that these reasons alone were enough to declare 
the quota laws constitutionally illegitimate, but then went on to 
"better clarify other aspects of the issue.,,165 The court did not 
analyze closely the differences between the quotas for candidate lists 
156. Legge 4 agosto 1993, n. 277, art. 1 (It.) (amending Decreto Presidente della 
RepubbJica 30 marzo 1957, n. 361, art. 4 (It.)). The 1993 law added the following 
sentence to the article describing how parliamentary seats are allocated to the different 
parties: "Le liste recanti piu di un nome sono formate da candidati e candidate, in 
ordine alternato." ["The lists with more than one name are made up of male and 
female candidates in alternating order."]. 
157. Pizzorusso & Rossi, supra note 151, at 174. 
158. D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 28; PIZZORUSSO & ROSSI, supra note 151, at 174. 
159. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422 (It.). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. § 6; D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 29-30. 
162. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422, § 3 (It.). 
163. Id. § 4. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. § 5. 
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and the alternating seating of men and women, but lumped the two 
approaches together to find them both unconstitutional. 166 
The court acknowledged that the language of the quota laws is 
"neutral" because neither sex is referred to explicitly.167 Nonetheless, 
the court concluded that the purpose was to ensure that a certain 
number of places on the candidate lists was reserved for women (as 
to law number 81) or to ensure that women actually obtained 
parliamentary seats (as to law number 277), providing a so-called 
opportunity for women to be elected versus women actually taking 
representative seats.168 In concluding that these mechanisms for 
determining candidates and members of parliament on the basis of 
sex violate the constitution's equality provisions, the court also 
acknowledged that "positive actions" are within the scope of article 3 
requiring the republic act to remove obstacles to equality. 169 The 
court stated that measures enacted to achieve equality for women in 
the workplacel70 and to promote female entrepreneurship 171 are 
legitimate affirmative actions pursuant to that section of article 3. 
However, the court specified that those measures do not infringe on 
the electoral rights of all citizens specified in article 51, which is very 
specific about prohibiting any differentiation on the basis of sex. 172 
Indeed, the court states that electoral quotas rely on discrimination 
now to remedy past discrimination and this is "expressly prohibited 
by article 51 of the constitution.,,173 Somewhat ironically, both 
Parliament and the court sought to protect the rights of the electorate; 
Parliament by creating political space for women l74 and the court by 
prohibiting any form of discrimination based on sex as to the 
candidates on the ballot. 175 
Interestingly, the court seemed to speak directly to women and 
equality advocates, stating: 
[S]ince [this court's] inception [in 1956], when presented 
with issues related to equality, this [c ]ourt has worked 
166. D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 31 (stating that the court actually confused the two 
approaches). 
167. At least one commentator describes this approach as a "gender-neutral regulation." 
Drude Dahlerup, What are the Effects of Electoral Gender Quotas?, 6 (July 2006), 
http://ipsa-rcI9 .anu.edu.aulDahlerup. ipsa06. pdf. 
168. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422 (It.). 
169. ld. 
170. Legge 10 aprile 1991, n. 125 (It.). 
171. Legge 25 febbraio 1992, n. 215 (It.). 
172. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422 (It.). 
173. ld. § 6. 
174. !d. § 3. 
175. ld. § 8. 
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toward the goal of eliminating all forms of discrimination, 
deciding in favor of measures that promote equality. 
However, these have always involved measures that did not 
directly infringe on the fundamental rights of all citizens.176 
353 
This statement could reveal the court's concern with how equality 
advocates might perceive it based upon this decision; perhaps, in part, 
because at the time of this decision no woman had been a part of the 
court. 177 Finally, the court suggested that political parties are 
certainly free to adopt affIrmative measures voluntarily.178 The court 
stated "the results sought by the law found unconstitutional may be 
achieved by persuading the political parties to realize that it is no 
longer possible to delay the need to reach equal representation of 
women in public life, particularly in elected positions.,,179 Nearly ten 
years later, the court would concede that the political parties had done 
next to nothing to achieve equilibrium. 18o 
Following the 1995 decision, statistical evidence demonstrates that 
Italian political parties did not heed the call to voluntarily increase 
the number of elected women representatives. 181 This is best 
illustrated by considering the number of women in elected positions 
in the years before this decision. In 1968, women made up 2.8% of 
the Camera dei deputati and 3.4% of the Senate.182 The percentage 
of women in the two houses combined was at 2.9% in 1968, the 
lowest point historically. 183 This combined percentage slowly 
increased to 3.2% in 1972,6.8% in 1976, and 7.2% in 1979, but took 
a slight dip in 1976 to 7.1%, then climbed to 10.8% in 1987. 184 The 
combined percentage dipped again in 1992 to 8.6%.185 The 1994 
176. 1d. §7. 
177. See Giudici constituzionali dal 1956 [Constitutional Court of Italy: Constitutional 
Court Judges since 1956], CORTE COST., http://www.cortecostituzionale.iti 
ActionPagina_210.do. 
17S. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1995,7 (It.). 
179. /d. 
ISO. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
181. See infra notes 182-94 and accompanying text. 
IS2. Marila Guadagnini, La Cittadinanza Politica: La Presenza delle donne in Parlamento 
negli anni novanta, in GENERE E DEMOCRAZIA: LA CITTADINANZA DELLE DONNE A 
CINQUANT' ANN I DAL VOTO [Political Citizenship: The Presence of Women in 
Parliament in the 1990s, in GENDER AND DEMOCRACY: WOMEN'S CmZENSillP FIITY 
YEARS AFTER THE VOTE] 51, 54 n.lO (1997). 
183. Alessandra Pescarol0, Esclusione 0 alterita? L'ltalia e it Governo Locale Della 
Toscana, in UNA DEMOCRAZIA INCOMPIUTA [Exclusion or Otherness? Italy and the 
Local Tuscan Government, in AN UNREALIZED DEMOCRACY] IS3, 191. 
184. /d. 
IS5. 1d. 
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election, the one election carried out under the 1993 quota law before 
it was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, resulted 
in women acquiring 15.1 % of the seats in the Camera dei Deputati; 
"certainly more than in prior elections, yet not close to the level of 
parity sought by the 1993 law.,,186 This resulted in a combined 
percentage of 12.8%.187 In the subsequent 1996 elections the 
presence of women in the Camera dei Deputati slipped to 11.4%188 
for a combined result of 9.9%.189 By 2001, women made up only 
9.2% of representatives in the Camera and Senato combined. 190 In 
2006 women made up 16% of both houses combined. l9l Currently, 
women make up 18.75% of the Senato l92 and 21.43% of the Camera 
dei deputati,193 together constituting 20.09%. It is unclear why the 
numbers have increased somewhat. Despite this increase, many 
Italian commentators have lamented the serious underrepresentation 
of women in Parliament, with some decrying these low numbers as 
"scandalous.,,194 Indeed, the number of women elected to office in 
Italy compares very poorly to that in many other countries.195 
186. Guadagnini, supra note 182, at 54. 
187. Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191. 
188. Guadagnini, supra note 182, at 54-55. 
189. Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191. 
190. Califano, supra note 97, at 48 n.1. But see Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191 (stating 
that the combined result was 10.3% in 2001). 
191. Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191. 
192. Statistics XVI Legislature, SENATO.!T, (Sept. 22, 2012), 
http://www.senato.itlleg/16/BGT/Schede/Statistiche/Composizione/SenatoriPerEta.ht 
mI. 
193. Chamber of Deputies, Composition of the House - Distinction of Deputies by Age and 
Sex, CAMERA.IT, (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.camera.itlCarnera/view/ 
doc_viewer _ ful1?url=http%3A1lwww.camera.itl564%3Ftiposezione%3DC%26sezion 
e%3Dl%26tabella%3DC_l_2&back_to=http%3A1lwww.camera.itl571. 
194. See, e.g., Maria Luisa Boccia, Crisi e critica della rappresentanza, in UNA 
DEMOCRAZIA INCOMPIUTA [Crisis and critique of representation, in INCOMPLETE 
DEMOCRACY] 304 (Nadia Maria Filippini & Anna Scattigno eds., 2007). Many of the 
other references in this article to Italian works express concerns about the 
underrepresentation of women in Italy. While these numbers are low compared to 
many other countries, they are slightly better than the numbers in the United States, 
where women make up 17% of each the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
The 112th Congress has 17 women in the Senate (17%). Office of History and 
Preservation, Office of the Clerk. Women in Congress, 1917-2006, HOUSE.GOV, 
http://womenincongress.house.govlhistorical-datairepresentatives-senators-by-
congress.htrnl?congress=112 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
195. See Ami Sedghi, International Women's Day 2012: Women's Representation in 
Politics, 1HE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.ukI 
news/datablog/20 12/mar/07 Iwomen-representation-in-politics-worldwide (ranking 
Italy number 57 out of 143 countries regarding percentage of women representatives 
in Parliament). 
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The creation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, the Carta di Nizza,196 in 2000 further highlighted this issue at 
the European level. Article 23 of this charter provides that 
"[ e ] quality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, 
including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall 
not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for 
specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex."i97 While 
this charter is not binding, the Italian Constitutional Court has relied 
on provisions of this charter in other decisions,198 and this provision 
in particular is relevant to the question of quote rose,199 or "pink 
quotas." Yet, when the issue of electoral quotas for women was 
before the Italian Constitutional Court again in 2003, the court did 
not refer to the Carta di Nizza.200 
The next parry in the back and forth between the Italian Parliament 
and the Constitutional Court on the issue of electoral quotas201 arose 
while the legislature was in the process of amending constitutional 
articles 117 and 51 in 2003.202 A constitutional amendment to article 
117 added a section stating, "The regional laws shall remove every 
obstacle that impedes full parity between men and women in social, 
cultural and economic life and shall promote parity of access to 
elected offices for women and men.,,203 Another constitutional 
196. Known in Italy as the Carta di Nizza. See Bill of Rights, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
INFORMATION OFFICE IN ITALY, http://www.europarl.itlview/itlcittadinanza_europea/ 
carta_dei_diritti.html (last visited Dec. 11,2012). 
197. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 200 OJ. (C 364) 1, art. 23, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdfltext_en.pdf (last visited Dec. 
11,2012). 
198. Califano, supra note 97, at 50, n.8 (referring to Corte Cost., 12 novembre 2002, n. 445 
(It.); Corte Cost., 11 aprile 2002, n. 135 (It.)). 
199. A number of Italian scholars use this term when referring to quotas for women. See, 
e.g., D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 34. 
200. See Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.), available at http://www.giurcost.org/ 
decisioni/2003/0049s-03.html. 
201. The Italian Parliament and the Constitutional Court have engaged in other such back-
and-forth exchanges. See William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to 
Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 449-52 
(2004) (describing Constitutional Court findings that changes to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure violated the constitution and subsequent Parliamentary amendments to the 
constitution to allow for such changes). 
202. See Marila Guadagnini, Gendering the Debate on Political Representation in Italy: A 
Difficult Challenge, in STATE FEMINISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 131, 144-47 
(Joni Lovenduski ed., 2005); Elisabetta Palici Di Suni, Gender Parity and Quotas in 
Italy: A Convoluted Reform Process, 35 W. EUR. POL. 380, 384-85 (2012). 
203. Legge Cost. 18 ottobre 2001, n. 3 (It.), available at http://www.parlamento.itl 
parlamlleggi/01003lc.htm (adding section 7 to article 117 of the Constitution) ("Le 
leggi regionali rimuovono ogni ostacolo che impedisce la piena parita degli uomini e 
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amendment, that had been approved after its first reading in the 
Camera dei deputati, but was not yet final, would eventually add the 
following sentence to section 1 of article 51, "to that end [of 
establishing equal access to public and elected offices] the Republic 
shall promote with appropriate measures equal opportunity between 
women and men.,,204 In addition to these constitutional amendments, 
Parliament also enacted a constitutional law that states, "In order to 
attain equilibrium of representation of the sexes, the law shall 
promote conditions of equal access to the electoral process. ,,205 
While these changes to the constitution were being enacted, the 
autonomous region of Valle d' Aosta adopted a regional law, which 
provided that "[ e ] very list of candidates for the election of the 
Consiglio must include candidates of both sexes.,,206 
Oddly enough, at the same time that the Italian government was 
working on constitutional reforms to overturn the Constitutional 
Court's 1995 decision striking electoral quotas, it challenged the 
Valle D'Aosta law cited above requiring the presence of both sexes 
on candidate lists.207 The government argued that the Valle D' Aosta 
law violated article 51 of the constitution and was inconsistent with 
delle donne nella vita sociale, culturale ed economica e promuovono la parita di 
accesso tra donne e uomini aile cariche elettive."). 
204. Art. 51 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), available at http://www.senato.itiistituzione/ 
2937511312891131328/13 1332/articolo.htm ("A tale fine la Repubblica promuove con 
appositi prevvedimenti Ie pari opportunita tra donne e uomini."). 
205. Legge Cost 31 gennaio 200 I, n. 2 (It.), available at 
http://www.pariamento.itipariarnlleggii0I002lc.htm ("AI fine di conseguire 
I'equilibrio della rappresentanza dei sessi, la .. .legge promuove condizioni di parita 
per I'accesso alle consultazioni elettorali."). 
206. Legge regionale 13 novembre 2002, n. 21 (It.), available at 
http://www.consiglio.regione.vda.itibanche_datilleggiJegolamentiidettaglio 
Jasp?pk_Ir=2682&versione=S ("Ogni lista di candidati all'elezione del Consiglio 
regionale deve prevedere la presenza di candidati di entrambii sessi."). This provision 
was subsequently amended to provide that "[i]n every list of candidates for the 
election of the Consiglio regionale neither sex may represent more than 20% of the 
candidates on the list." L. Reg. 7 agosto 2007, n. 22 (It.), available at 
http://www.consiglio.regione.vda.itlbanche _ datilleggi 
Jegolamentildettaglio Jasp?pk _1r=4124. Other similar regional statutes and laws 
were enacted between 2002 and 2010, but the Valle D'Aosta law was the subject ofa 
constitutional court decision discussed above. For a comprehensive list of laws, court 
decisions and other materials relevant to the question of electoral quotas, see 
D' AMICO, supra note 96, at 146-229. 
207. D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 34. See also Lorenza Carlassare, La legittimita della 
"preferenza di genere ": una nuova sconfitta della linea del Governo contro la parita 
[The legitimacy of "gender preferences": a new defeat of the Government's position 
against parity] 55 GIUR. COST. 81, 83 (2010) ("[T]he government's stubborn 
opposition to laws that attempt to carry out the constitutional laws favoring equality in 
elected offices is nearly incredible. "). 
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the court's decision of 1995, claiming that the law amounted to a 
quota for women candidates because it required a minimum of one 
woman candidate on all lists.208 The government argued that the 
court had previously disregarded any distinction between electoral 
laws that simply required women be on lists of candidates and thus 
eligible for election, so-called eleggibilita, and laws that ensured a 
certain number of women would hold elected office, or so-called 
candidabilita.209 However, in its 2003 decision, the court examined 
this distinction more closely, as well as the effect of ensuring access 
to electoral slates.21O The court found that this law, and others like it, 
did not violate the constitutional equality norms. 211 
The court first stated that the measure at issue involved only 
candidate lists and those who could be on the lists, eleggibilita and 
not candidabilita.212 In addition, the court held that the Valle 
D' Aosta measure did not create inequality to address past inequality 
and thus did not infringe on the rights of voters. 213 Rather, this 
measure merely denies political parties the ability to present lists of 
candidates made up of individuals of only one sex.214 It is not 
entirely clear how this is different from the law found 
unconstitutional in 1995 that did not permit either sex to make up 
more than two-thirds of a list, other than the fact that the prior law set 
out a specific percentage of the list reserved for one sex.215 However, 
in its 2003 opinion the court acknowledged that its analysis was 
consistent with an "evolved" constitutional paradigm.216 The court 
then cited to the constitutional law of 2001, which expressly directs 
208. See Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.), available at 
http://www.giurcost.orgidecisioniJ2003/0049s-03.html; GUADAGNlNI, supra note 202, 
at 144-47; Rodriguez-Ruiz & Rubio-Marin, Constitutional Justification of Parity 
Democracy, 60 ALA. L. REv. 1171, 1177 (2005). 
209. Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.). 
210. See id. 
211. See id. § 5. 
212. See id. § 3.1. 
213. See id. § 4. 
214. Seeid. §4,4.1. 
215. See generally Giuditta Brunelli, Un Overruling in tema di norme elettorali 
antidiscriminatorie [An Overruling on the issue of anti-discrimination electoral 
measures] 5 LE REGIONI 902 (2003) (commenting on Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 
49 (It.)); Antonio D' Aloia, Egualianza Sostanziale e Azioni Posiive in Materia 
Elettorale, in VERSO UNA DEMOCRAZIA PARlTARIA - MODELLI E PERCORSI PER LA 
PlENA PARTECIPAZIONE DELLE DONNE ALLA VITA POLITICA E ISTITUZIONALE [Substantive 
Equality and Affirmative Electoral Measures, in TOWARD A DEMOCRACY OF P ARlTY -
APPROACHES FOR ACHIEVING FULL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL LIFE] 49, 61 (Anna Falcone ed., 2011). 
216. See Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.). 
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the regional electoral laws to promote conditions of parity for access 
to the electoral process precisely with the goal of achieving equal 
representation of the sexes.217 The court found the Valle D' Aosta law 
consistent with the constitutionallaw.218 
While stating that the following fact was not decisive, the court 
harkened back to its earlier call for political parties to take voluntary 
actions to increase the number of women elected to political 
positions, and stated that since "political parties have not 
demonstrated much, if any, propensity to act voluntarily to achieve 
greater equality of representation, as the court had urged in its 1995 
opinion, now the parties are constrained by law pursuant to the recent 
constitutionallaw.,,219 The court seemed to suggest that the failure or 
reluctance of political parties to address this issue resulted in the 
enactment of legal requirements to achieve a goal of greater sexual 
parity for elected offices. 
While the Constitutional Court did not address the pending changes 
to article 51 of the constitution in its 2003 opinion, it set out quite 
emphatically the effects of this change in a 2005 opinion. 220 The 
2005 Constitutional Court case involved a 1993 law221 requiring that, 
for positions subject to competition examinations, at least one-third 
of those taking the examination be women. The Consiglio di Stato 
challenged a competition examination for director of a local museum 
that, pursuant to the 1993 law, required that at least one-third of the 
examinees be women.222 The Consiglio di Stato claimed that a man 
had been excluded from this particular competition due to his sex.223 
The court dismissed this challenge with a short opinion stating that 
the lower court had relied only on the Constitutional Court's decision 
of 1995 and did not take into account the changes to article 51 of the 
constitution, the 2001 constitutional law, and the Constitutional 
Court's decision of 2003.224 The court provided an initial glimpse of 
its interpretation of the changes to article 51, stating that "with this 
new language, the law is no longer limited to prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sex, . .. but now assigns to the 
217. See id. at 4. 
218. Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.). 
219. ld. § 4; see also Yvonne Galligan, Bringing Women in: Global Strnggles for Gender 
Parity in Political Representation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 
319,332 (2006) (despite the creation offorrnal party rules in the reform of the Italian 
Communist Party that included a 40% quota for women, in 2003 women made up 
only 24% of the party's deputies). 
220. Cort Cost., 12 gennaio 2005, n. 39 (It.). 
221. Decreto Legislativo 3 febbraio 1993, n. 29 (It.). 
222. Corte Cost., 12 gennaio 2005, n. 39 (It.). 
223. Jd. 
224. Jd. 
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Republic the obligation of promoting equal opportunity between men 
and women. ,,225 Thus, although the court did not set out a 
comprehensive interpretation of the changes to article 51, the court 
nonetheless described these changes as a clear shift in the 
constitutional approach to gender equality.226 
In 2010, the court had the opportunity to apply the new article 51 to 
electoral quotas. 227 Like the 2005 decision, the 2010 opinion also 
involved a regional election law of the Campania region. 228 Similar 
to the law governing Italian representation in the European 
Parliament, this law provides that in every electoral list neither sex 
may be represented by more than two-thirds of the candidates.229 
Furthermore, the law voided every list that did not comply with this 
requirement. 230 However, the provision that the Consiglio di Stato 
challenged was one that directed voters to "select one or two names 
[from the list of candidates]. If [ the voter] selected two names, one 
must be male and the other must be female, otherwise the second 
name selected would be void.,,231 The government claimed that this 
portion of the law violated both articles 3 and 51 of the 
constitution.232 The law violated article 3, according to the 
government, because it treated the second candidate unequally based 
on his or her sex if he or she was of the same sex as the first 
candidate selected by the voter. 233 The law violated article 51 
because it tied access to an elected position to the sex of the second 
candidate selected by the voter and was thus an improper basis for 
unelectability.234 The Region of Campania emphasized the neutrality 
of the language used in the statute, which would void both a selection 
225. Jd. 
226. Jd. 
227. Corte Cost., 15 dicembre 2009, n. 4 (It.). 
228. Legge regionale 27 marzo 2009, n. 4, in Boll. Uff. Reg. Campania, 14 aprile 2009, n. 
23 (It.). 
229. Id. art. 10(2). 
230. Jd. 10(3). 
231. Id. art. 4(3) ("L'elettore puo esprimere ... uno 0 due voti di preferenza ... Nel caso 
di espressione di due preferneze, una deve riguardare un candidato di genere maschile 
e l'altra un candidato di genere fernminile della stess lista, pena I'annullarnneto della 
seconda preferenza. "). It is not clear why some regional laws use the term "gender" 
rather than "sex." However, it does not seem likely that the regions using the term 
gender intend this to indicate any particular "gender theory." See Marco Olivetti, La 
c.d. ''preferenza di genere" al vaglio del sindacato di costituzionalito. Alcuni rilievi 
critici [The so-called "gender preferences" and their constitutionality. Afew critical 
points/observations] 1 GIUR. COST. 84, 86 n.7 (2010). 
232. Corte Cost., 15 dicembre 2009, n. 4, (It.), § 1 (setting out the government's argument). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
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of two women as well as a selection of two men candidates.235 The 
court set out an extensive summary of the Campania's argument, 
which includes a time line of the court's related decisions, changes to 
the constitution in between the decision number 422 of 1995 and the 
decision number 49 of 2003, other legislative measures, European 
Charters, La Carta Nizza, as well as Commission decisions.236 In 
particular, the Campania region pointed to the language of the 
amendment to article 51 directing the republic to promote equal 
opportunity between men and women using appropriate provisions.237 
The court described the law challenged as one that seeks to achieve 
greater equilibrium between the sexes in elected office while also 
seeking to avoid infringing on the rights of the Italian voters to vote 
for the candidate(s) of their choice.238 The court further explained the 
Campania law as giving voters an opportunity to select two 
candidates; a voter need not select twO. 239 In addition, the law does 
not void the entire ballot if the voter selects two candidates of the 
same sex; rather, the law voids only the second selection.240 Given 
these aspects of this law, the court concluded that it creates a greater 
possibility of achieving greater equality in the election of women, but 
does not impose election of particular candidates.241 Thus, the court 
found that this law constitutionally promotes equality without being 
coercive or intruding on the rights of voters. 242 
The Campania law in fact resulted in the election of more 
women.243 In the March 2010 regional elections, out of sixty seats up 
for election, fourteen women were elected.244 While about 23% may 
not seem like much, it is certainly a dramatic improvement from the 
election of only two women in 2005 in this region?45 In addition, this 
235. ld. § 2 (setting out Campania's argument). 
236. ld. § 3 (summarizing Campania's briefed arguments). 
237. Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 2010, n. 4, (It.), available at http://www.giurcost.orgl 
decisionil2010/0004s-1O.html (setting out Campania's argument in support of its 
election law). 
238. ld. § 3.2. 
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list without expressing a preference for any candidates. Olivetti, supra note 231, at 
87. 
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decisionil20 1 0/00045-1 O.html. 
241. Id. § 3.3. 
242. Id. § 3.2. 
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indirettamente ed eventualmente, if risultato di un 'azione positive," 1 GIUR. COST. 93, 
94 (2010). 
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result is better than that achieved in other regions. 246 Piemonte 
elections achieved the same results as those in Campania (fourteen 
women out of sixty positions),247 but in Lombardia, only seven 
women were elected out of eighty seats248 (about 8.7%) and only 
twelve out of seventy-one seats in Lazio were filled by women (about 
17%).249 Meanwhile, in Calabria and Basilicata, no women were 
elected at al1.250 While these developments are certainly promising, a 
number of attempts to enact electoral quotas at the national level 
since the constitutional changes have failed. 
For example, one proposal presented in 2004 would have restored 
the limit that neither sex make up more than two-thirds of a party's 
candidate list.25 I In addition, this proposal would have required that 
men and women candidates be listed in an alternating fashion. 252 
This proposal would have also included reduced state financial 
support for political parties presenting candidate lists in violation of 
these requirements.253 This proposed law was approved by the 
Senate, but modified to require the presence of 50% of each sex in a 
party's candidate lists.254 However, the conclusion of the legislative 
session meant that this never became law. Another proposal would 
have required that no more than three candidates of the same sex 
could be listed consecutively on a party's list in the election 
following enactment of the law, and in the subsequent election, no 
more than two candidates of the same sex could be so listed. 255 This 
measure was presented by the government but was blocked in the 
Senate after disagreement among the majority.256 This particular 
proposal would have applied to only two elections, and thus was 
limited in time.257 
The back and forth between the Italian Parliament and the 
Constitutional Court was settled after the constitutional amendments; 
yet, nearly ten years after these changes, attempts to reenact electoral 
246. Jd. at 93, 94 n.lO. 
247. Jd. 
248. Id. at 94 n.1 O. 
249. Jd. 
250. Jd. 
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AND BELGIUM 56, 14 n.9 (2008). 
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quotas at the national level have failed in precisely the political 
spaces in which women are attempting to gain greater access. 258 This 
is another example of reforms that come tantalizingly close to 
achieving equality yet proceed at a grudgingly sluggish pace. Of 
course, the irony is that women's meager representation in Parliament 
endures in large part because the male-dominated Parliament has not 
successfully enacted laws to alleviate this problem. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Aside from traditional notions of equality, the principal argument 
against electoral quotas for women is that quotas are based on an 
assumption that women can better represent other women.259 This in 
tum, is based on an essentialist understanding of women's identity.260 
Certainly, awareness of essentialism and the need to ensure that no 
universal female identity is presumed has played an important role in 
broadening feminism to include more than simply white, middle class 
women. However, in the context of elected positions, where women 
have been deliberately excluded, as in Italy,261 it is important to 
weigh anti-essentialist concerns against the continued monopolization 
of political space by men. The history of how this monopoly has 
severely limited citizenship rights of women demonstrates how 
critically powerful political space is and how important it is to enact 
mechanisms to open political space to more women. 262 Furthermore, 
creating greater political space for women can help to address 
essentialist perceptions by debunking deeply rooted stereotypes about 
the proper role of women in Italy. 263 A recent United Nations report 
stating that "[v ]iolence against women remains a significant problem 
in Italy,,,264 links the structural issue of male dominance in the public 
and private sectors as one explanation for both the high rate of 
violence against women as well as the dramatic underreporting of this 
violence. The Special Rapporteur recommends, among other 
specifics, that Italy address the "gender disparities in public and 
private sectors... to increase the number of women. .. in the 
258. See supra notes 201--02, 250-57 and accompanying text. 
259. Rosenblum, supra note 20, at 1182. 
260. Rosenblum, supra note 20, at 1135-37. 
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political, economic, social, cultural and judicial spheres. ,,265 Opening 
these public spaces to women can eliminate women's negative 
presence and both broaden and deepen political discourse.266 It 
would be unfortunate if anti-essentialist concerns were the basis for 
perpetuating women's negative presence in the political arena. 
265. Id. at 23. 
266. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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